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Surviving Defeat: Battlefield Surrender in 
Classical Greece 
 
Abstract: The fate of war captives has been extensively explored, as, indeed, has the way 
that fate affects both the conduct and course of hostilities. Nevertheless, little research has 
been conducted on the link that connects the two, namely the act of surrender, and this is 
especially true of classical Greece. This article seeks to remedy this situation by answering 
three interlinked questions, namely: how did men attempt to surrender on the battlefields of 
classical Greece?; in what tactical conditions did they do so?; and finally, what prospects did 
they have of surviving the process? 





The fate of war captives has been extensively explored,
1
 as, indeed, has the way that 
fate affects both the conduct and course of hostilities.
2
 Nevertheless, as Cook observes, little 
research has been conducted on the link that connects the two, namely the act of surrender, 
and this is especially true of classical Greece, for which little is known beyond the mere fact 
that surrenders did sometimes occur.
3
 If we are to believe Plato, however, surrender was a 
simple matter: all a defeated hoplite had to do to escape death is throw down his arms (ὅπλα 
                                                             
 Corresponding author: Jason Crowley, The Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, M15 6LL, E-
Mail: j.crowley@mmu.ac.uk 
1 For scholarship focusing on classical Greece, see Ducrey (1968); Gaca (2010), 117-161; Jackson (1970), 37-
53; Jones (1987), 139-155; Kapellos (2013), 464-472; Karavites (1982); Kelly (1970), 127-131; Krentz (1989), 
179-180; Panagopoulos (1978); Pritchett (1991), 203-312; Rosivach (1999), 129-157; Strauss (1983), 24-35; 
Wolpert (2002), 4-9, 119-125; Wylie (1986), 125-41. 
2 Research on this subject tends to focus on more modern conflicts, particularly the First World War. For an 
overview, see esp. Cook (2006), 637-665; Dollery and Parson (2007), 499-512; Ferguson (1998), 367-394, 
(2004), 148-192; Grauer (2014), 622-655; Grossman (1996), 203-227. 
3 Cook (2006), 637-665; cf. Cartledge (2012),15-28. Cartledge’s contribution, is, however, intended for a 
general audience and his examination is limited as a result.  
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ἀφεὶς) and supplicate his pursuers (καὶ ἐφ᾽ ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων).
4
 This 
portrayal of battlefield surrender, of course, serves Plato’s rhetorical strategy, which is to 
present his old teacher, Socrates, as the good philosopher, who, having received his mission 
from Apollo, stands fast in the face of overwhelming odds, like a hoplite placed in the ranks 
by his commander. In this metaphor, the hoplite-philosopher must hold his ground and, if 
necessary, die honourably, rather than abandoning his assigned position and incurring the 
disgrace of flight and surrender.
5
 Thus, the emphasis Plato places on the simplicity of 
surrender is intended to highlight the courage of his mentor who refused to take this 
apparently easy way out.
6
   
Plato’s portrayal of surrender, therefore, serves an obvious rhetorical purpose, yet 
clearly, it would lose much of its appeal if it was not at least superficially plausible. To avoid 
this, Plato stays within the collective knowledge and experience of his audience, who knew 
that surrender was both possible and negotiated through the abandonment of arms and the 
actual or metaphorical supplication of the victor.
7
 Plato’s portrayal then, is plausible, but a 
modern example suggests that whilst surrender may have been simple on the rhetorical 
battlefield, it was far more complex in reality. 
 The case in question is infamous, primarily because of the controversy it created at 
the time. It occurred on the 28
th
 of May 1982 during the British advance on Goose Green, 
when Lt. James Barry, the commander of 12 platoon, D company, of the 2
nd
 battalion of the 
Parachute Regiment, apparently saw a white flag flying on an enemy position to the 
immediate south of the settlement. Witnesses agree that Barry went forward to accept the 
                                                             
4 Plat. Apol. 39a. This passage was brought to my attention by Nicolas Denyer, for whose kindness and 
intellectual generosity I remain grateful.  
5 For the normative expectation that a hoplite should hold his position, see Aeschin. 3.7; On. Strat. 6.1.3, 10.3, 
27.1, 32.6-8; Plat. Lach. 190e-91e; Plut. Cim. 17.3-5; Soph. Ant. 640-81; Xen. Anab. 1.8.3, 4.3.28-9, Cav. 2.2-9, 
Cyrop. 2.1.25-8, 3.3.69-70, 6.3.25, Ec. 8.1-10, 14-15, 18-20, Mem. 3.1.9. For the offence of lipotaxia, see 
Aeschin. 3.175-6; Andoc. 1.74; Dem. 21.103; Lyc. 1.147; cf. Lys. 10.1, 9, 12, 21-4, 27-30, 14.5-8, 39.17; Plat. 
Rep. 5.468a.  
6 See esp. 28a-39e; cf. Aesch. PB 1002. 
7 For examples and discussion, see Section 2 below.  
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surrender, but despite good intentions, he was killed after a brief parley with the enemy. His 
death, inevitably, was presented in the popular press as a disgraceful murder committed by a 
dishonourable and perfidious enemy, but as Fitz-Gibbon demonstrates, this was simply not 
the case. His investigation, which builds on that of Benest (an officer who served with 2 Para) 




Consensus exists in respect of two crucial details, namely that Barry moved forward 
as other members of 2 Para assaulted an enemy occupied schoolhouse to his left, and that, at 
some point during the incident, a burst of tracer rounds, perhaps from this engagement, 
passed over the apparently surrendering Argentine position. Accounts from Argentine troops, 
however, deny any white flag was flown and indicate that they thought Barry was trying to 
surrender to them, which may explain the demeanour of those involved in the parley, who 
retained their weapons and appeared to be trying to get Barry to lay down his rifle. What 
actually happened remains unclear, but it seems that this cross-communication ended when 
the tracers flew over the parley party, and thinking that they were being engaged, the 
Argentine negotiators, or those in nearby fighting positions, opened fire on Barry, killing him 




This incident, then, took place in a tactical environment which was both confused and 
fluid, and whilst Barry’s actions were both humane and heroic, as Fitz-Gibbon concludes, in 
moving forward to accept the enemy’s surrender, he ‘took a considerable and unnecessary 
risk’.
10
 Indeed, this risk was so obvious to Barry’s Company Commander, Major Phil Neame, 
that he tried to stop him approaching the enemy position, and one of Barry’s immediate 
                                                             
8 Fitz-Gibbon (1995), 158-162. 
9 Fitz-Gibbon (1995), 158-162. 
10 Fitz-Gibbon (1995), 160. 
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subordinates was so shocked by his actions that he declared that “he must have gone mad!”
11 
Barry’s death, then, highlights the importance of the prevailing tactical environment as well 
as an aspect of the capitulation process that is often ignored by historians, namely the grave 
danger the victor often faces when attempting to accept an offer of surrender.
12
  
Such complexities, naturally, are absent from Plato’s rhetorically-determined vision 
of battlefield surrender. Nevertheless, the ancient battlefield was every bit as confusing and 
dangerous as its modern counterpart, and this begs an obvious and hitherto unanswered 
question, namely, on the battlefields of classical Greece, when the tide of battle turned and 
combat gave way to pursuit and slaughter, what realistic prospects, if any, did a defeated 
hoplite have of surrendering? Before this question can be answered, however, it is necessary 
to examine two subordinate and so far overlooked considerations: firstly, how did men 
attempt to surrender on the battlefields of classical Greece; and secondly, in what tactical 
conditions did they do so?  
 
2. The Act of Surrender 
 
As the incident discussed above suggests, modern combatants, despite the 
expectations of international law, tend to view surrender as a two part process: the enemy 
offers to surrender, and the victor, after performing a cost-benefit analysis, then decides 
whether to accept or reject that offer.
13
 The Homeric heroes took a similar view, as the Iliad 
reveals. The poem contains five scenes in which defeated opponents attempt to save 
themselves by supplication: in book six, Adrastus attempts to supplicate Menelaus; in book 
                                                             
11 Fitz-Gibbon (1995), 159. 
12 See esp. Cook (2006), 637-665. 
13 Consider, for instance, J.S.P. (2004), 5.6-10, 10.5-39, which reflects both the position stipulated by the Hague 
Convention (namely that an enemy who lays down his arms and indicates his desire to surrender is categorised 
immediately as hors de combat, and as such, can no longer be attacked), and the realities of the battlefield (in 
that it accepts there is no obligation on the victor to expose himself to danger in order to accept a surrender). 
These two incompatible expectations, of course, produce a very obvious ambiguity that soldiers tend to interpret 
in the interests of their own safety. For further discussion, see Bourke (1999), 171-214; Cook (2006), 637-665; 
Dollery and Parson (2007), 499-512; Ferguson (1998), 367-394, (2004), 148-192; Holmes (2003), 360-393; 
Wallace (2012), 955-981. 
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ten Dolōn attempts to supplicate Odysseus and Diomedes; in book eleven, Peisander and 
Hippolochus attempt to supplicate Agamemnon; in book twenty, Tros attempts to supplicate 
Achilles; and finally, in book twenty-one, Lycaon attempts to supplicate Achilles.
14
  
As is well known, the victors reject all these attempts and thereafter kill their defeated 
opponents,
15
 and these deaths, combined with reported incidents in which protagonists 
indicate a newfound reluctance to take prisoners,
16
 together emphasise the merciless nature of 
the Trojan War.
17
 The scenes, in addition, also demonstrate three other aspects of Homeric 
capitulation: firstly, as is the case in modern warfare, it is a two part process; secondly, the 
victor is not obligated to accept; thirdly, rejection inevitably leads to the death of the 
defeated.
18
 The situation then, in The Iliad at least, seems reasonably clear. This text, 
however, was composed much earlier than the period under consideration. Nevertheless, The 
Iliad played a central role in Greek education, and consequently, as Lendon has 
demonstrated, its values exercised an ongoing influence on Greek attitudes to war and 
combat, so the rules of epic could conceivably apply to the battlefields of classical Greece.
19
   
Certainly, in the historical record, surrender was more than a theoretical possibility: 
the Greeks, and those non-Greeks they fought, were, despite the inconvenience prisoners 
often entailed, sometimes willing and able to take prisoners during open combat.
20
 
Herodotus, for instance, describes how the Spartans carried fetters when they attacked Tegea 
around 575 BC, but after they were defeated in battle, those Spartans who were captured 
                                                             
14 For a possible representation of this process in art, see Beazley 41058 (Boston Museum of Fine Arts, 
accession no. 1979.618), also 204505 (St. Petersburg State Hermitage Museum, accession no. B1542).  
15 Adrastus: Hom. Il. 6.37-71; Dolōn: 10.372-465; Peisander and Hippolochus: 11.122-150; Tros: 20.464-70; 
Lycaon: 21.64-135. 
16 See, for instance, Hom. Il. 2.229-31, 11.104-12, 18.336-7, 21.26-28, 34-135, 22.38-50, 23.22-3, 174-6, 
24.746-55; cf. 16.330-2. 
17 For further discussion, see Goldhill (1990), 373-76; Gould (1973), 74-103; Kelly (2014), 147-67; Naiden 
(2006), 29-104; Parker (1983), 146, 181-6; Pedrick (1982), 125-40. 
18 Which explains why the defeated often promise a ransom, for which see esp. Pedrick (1982), 125-140; contra 
Gould (1973), 74-103. For a non-military example, see Lys. 1.25. 
19 Lendon (2005), passim. 
20 See, for instance, Hdt. 9.117.1-118.2; Xen. Anab. 1.6.2, 7.6.31, Cav. 8.13, Cyrop. 4.1.19, 5.1.28, 7.1.24-45, 
Hell. 7.4.26, Mem. 3.12.1-4; cf. Isoc. 14.18. For the problems caused by prisoners, see Section 4 below.  
6 
 
(ὅσοι αὐτῶν ἐζωγρήθησαν), ended up wearing their own chains (πέδας τε ἔχοντες τὰς 
ἐφέροντο αὐτοὶ).
21
 Chains also feature in his account of an Athenian double victory in 506 
BC at the Euripus Straits. The first engagement, fought on the Greek mainland, was against 
the Boeotians, from whom the Athenians took seven hundred prisoners. The second, after the 
Athenians crossed to Euboea later that same day, was against the Chalcidians, from whom an 
unspecified number of prisoners was taken. These men, together with the Boeotians taken in 




Thucydides also reports an engagement which took place in 447 BC, when Athenian-
led forces were defeated by Boeotian exiles and their allies at Coronea, as a result of which 
some of their troops were killed (τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν) and others taken prisoner (τοὺς δὲ 
ζῶντας ἔλαβον).
23
 Later, he describes how, in 424 BC, during the Peloponnesian War, an 
amphibious assault led by Demosthenes against Sicyon was counterattacked by local forces, 
and in the subsequent pursuit, again, some men were killed (τοὺς μὲν ἀπέκτειναν) and others 
captured (τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον).
24
  
Xenophon, in addition to describing the occasions when the Ten Thousand set 
ambushes in order to gather intelligence from prisoners, also records incidents in which 
enemies were captured in open combat.
25
 For example, he describes an incident which took 
place at the start of the Ten Thousand’s retreat in which a Greek quick reaction force, made 
up of newly formed light infantry and cavalry, successful engaged the harassing Persians, 
killing many of the enemy infantry (τῶν τε πεζῶν ἀπέθανον πολλοὶ), and capturing some of 
                                                             
21 Hdt. 1.66.3-4; cf. Paus. 8.47.2-4. 
22 Hdt. 5.77.1-4. 
23 Thuc. 1.113.1-4; cf. Diod. Sic. 12.6; Paus. 1.27.5, 29.13; Plut. Ages. 19.2, Per. 18.1-3.   
24 Thuc. 4.101.3-4. 
25 Since they were retreating through unfamiliar territory, intelligence for the Greeks was at a premium, and the 
obvious source thereof was prisoners. See esp. Xen. Anab. 3.2.20, 4.1.22-5, 4.16-22, 6.17, 7.22; cf. Cav. 4.7-8, 
7-12.15, Cyrop. 2.4.15-23, 6.1.25-6, 2.11, 3.5-12, also Hom. Il. 10.372-465. For further discussion, see Russell 
(1999) and (2013), 474-492. 
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their horsemen (τῶν ἱππέων… ζωοὶ ἐλήφθησαν).
26
 Similarly, he relates how, as his army 
marched through Thessaly prior to the battle of Coronea in 394 BC, Agesilaus’ engaged and 
defeated enemy cavalry, killing some enemy horsemen (οἱ μὲν ἀπέθνῃσκον αὐτῶν) and 
capturing others (οἱ δὲ καὶ ἡλίσκοντο).
27
 Finally, he describes how, in 365 BC, the Eleans 
assaulted enemy troops who had taken refuge on a hilltop nearly Pylus, killing some (τοὺς 




Interestingly, the matter of fact way such incidents are reported suggest they are not 
particularly unusual, but they are, nevertheless, relatively rare, and rarer still are those which 
include a description of the surrender process.
29
 Taking these in chronological order, the first 
is Herodotus’ account of the Theban surrender at Thermopylae in 480 BC. There, the 
Thebans offer to surrender by approaching the Persians with their arms outstretched 
(χεῖράς… προέτεινον), and while some were killed before their offer was accepted, their 
surrender was nevertheless successful.
30
  
Next, is Thucydides’ description of the Theban surrender at Plataea in 431 BC. As 
Thucydides relates, after the failure of their attempted coup and having been assaulted, 
overrun and pursued, the surviving Thebans agreed to surrender (παραδοῦναι) both their arms 
and themselves (σφᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ὅπλα) to the Plataeans.
31
 Further details then emerge 
during the ‘trial’ of the Plataeans, specifically that the Thebans had, apparently, offered to 
surrender by stretching out their hands (χεῖρας προϊσχομένους) and the Plataeans took them 
                                                             
26 Xen. Anab. 3.4.5. Given 3.5.14, these men too may have been captured for topographic intelligence.  
27 Xen. Hell. 4.3.3-9, see also Cav. 8.13. 
28 Xen. Hell. 7.4.26. 
29 This is sometimes omitted even when prisoners appear in historical narratives, as a result of which both their 
status and the circumstances of their capture remain unclear. See, for instance, Thuc. 5.35.4-5, 77.1, with more 
general discussion of prisoners in Plat. Prot. 326b-c, Rep. 5.468a-b. 
30 Hdt. 7.233.1-2; cf. Plut. De Herodoti Malignitate 33. The Greeks seem to have considered that this gesture 
transcended cultural boundaries. See, for instance, Hdt. 4.136.1; Xen. Cyrop. 4.2.17-19, 6.3.13.  
31 Thuc. 2.2.1-5.7. 
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prisoner (ζωγρήσαντες) as a result.
32
 This description is then followed by Thucydides’ 
account of the Spartan surrender on Sphacteria in 425 BC, which is especially notable, not 
least because it is the victorious Athenians who invite their defeated opponents to 
capitulate.
33
 They, according to Thucydides, indicated their acceptance of this offer by 




Finally, two surrender accounts also appear in Thucydides’ account of the Sicilian 
Campaign. In 413 BC, Demosthenes agreed, after the victorious Syracusans had opened a 
dialogue with his trapped and isolated contingent, to surrender his men (παραδοῦναι) on the 
condition that their lives be spared (μὴ ἀποθανεῖν).
35
 Those men led by Nicias, however, 
were unprotected by such formal arrangements, and as a result, were not so lucky. They were 
caught crossing the Assinarus and massacred until Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus 
(ἑαυτὸν παραδίδωσι) and asked the Spartan to stop the slaughter (παύσασθαι φονεύοντας). 
Thankfully, Gylippus agreed and immediately gave the order to take prisoners 
(ζωγρεῖν…ἐκέλευεν). Interestingly, however, as Thucydides reveals, not all prisoner taking 
was official: at the conclusion of hostilities, the number of prisoners who had become the 
illicit property of their captors exceeded those collected by the Syracusan state.
36
  
Clearly then, there are important continuities between Homeric and historical 
depictions of surrender. Homeric protagonists appear to engage in a supplication ritual, a 
religiously governed procedure which features several successive phases. The process, as 
                                                             
32 Thuc. 3.66.1-3. 
33 Thuc. 4.37.1-38.5. 
34 Thuc. 4.38.1; cf. Pol. Strat. 4.9.3, also Plat. Menex. 242c-d. One of those shields (identified by the inscription 
‘The Athenians from the Lacedaemonians at Pylos’, and currently located in the Agora Museum, Athens) has 
survived. Presumably, it formed part of the set displayed on the Painted Stoa described by Pausanias (1.15.4), 
where they served as a collective victory monument. Shields, naturally, suited this purpose admirably: the shield 
was the hoplite’s defining item of equipment, and so its loss or surrender was an unquestionable marker of 
defeat (see for instance, Aristoph. Birds 1470-81; Xen. Hell. 1.2.3, also Thuc. 4.38.1, in which the Spartans 
indicate their willingness to surrender, in the first instance, by dropping their shields).      
35 Thuc. 7.81.1-82.3. 
36 Thuc. 7.84.1-87.6; cf. Dem. 20.42; Diod. Sic. 13.19-33; Plut. Nic. 27-29, also IG II2 174. For the reflection of 
similar motifs, see Plut. Tim. 28.1-29.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 16.80.5. 
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Naiden sets out, is initiated by the defeated combatant. He approaches the victor and makes a 
symbolic gesture: stretching out his empty hands, and/or abasing himself before his opponent 
while making ritual physical contact with him. Then, the defeated combatant makes a request 
for mercy, usually sweetened with incentives such as the prospect of ransom. At this point, 
the victor considers the request, decides whether to accept or reject, and if his response 
negative, he must break any physical contact with the defeated combatant before killing 
him.
37
   
This process is reflected to some extent in Herodotus and Thucydides: the gesture is 
present, as is the request and the response, but whether this makes surrender an actual act of 
supplication, a distinct type of supplication, an abbreviated form of supplication or a 
metaphorical supplication, remains opaque. Parker’s opinion, however, is persuasive. He 
argues that acts of supplication fall into two categories, ‘help me’ and ‘spare me’, and since 
those who fall into the first have an absolute claim not to be harmed and the second do not, it 
seems likely that only the former qualify as actual supplicants, whereas the latter supplicate 
metaphorically in order to enhance the emotional appeal of their entreaties.
38
 This distinction, 
according to Parker, is ‘no mere linguistic quibble’ since in means that ‘the ‘spare me’ 
suppliant has no Zeus of Suppliants to invoke in his defence, and thus nothing like an 
absolute title to mercy.’
39
 
 In both epic and on the battlefields of classical Greece, then, it seems clear that in 
order to surrender, a defeated combatant generally had to make an offer to his victorious 
adversary. This evoked the language and symbols of supplication and was communicated by 
the abandonment of arms, the display of empty and outstretched hands, and, if possible, a 
                                                             
37 For discussion of this procedure, see esp. Naiden (2004), 71-91, (2006); Kelly (2014), 147-167; Parker 
(1983), 146, 181-186; contra Gould (1973), 74-103, whose view rejects this freedom to judge, and Philipson 
(1911), 272, who believes that killing a supplicant was forbidden. 
38 Parker (1983), 146, 181-186, and for a similar view, see Gould (1973), 74-103. 





 The victor then had to decide whether or not to accept, and when making 
this choice, he was unconstrained both by the demands of piety, since his defeated opponent 
was not religiously protected, and empowered by ‘τὰ νόμιμα τῶν Ἑλλήνων’, that is the 
conventions of war,
41
 since the Greeks took the view that the fate of the loser was determined 
by the winner.
42
 The victor, then, was free to decide whether to accept or reject an offer of 
surrender. This freedom, however, was not exercised in a vacuum, and so next question to 
answer, then, is under what tactical conditions did Greeks attempt to surrender?   
 
3. The Circumstances of Surrender 
 
 The best place to start is with those instances in which defeated Greeks surrendered 
successfully. These fall into three categories, namely siege warfare, naval operations, and 
land operations. In the first, despite the very real risk a siege might end in the massacre of 
defenders and the enslavement of their surviving dependents, successful surrenders are 
relatively plentiful.
43
 For instance, in c.465 BC, when a dispute over mining and trading 
rights escalated into armed conflict and secession from the Delian League, Thasos was 
besieged by the Athenians, and although the Thasians stubbornly resisted for more than two 
years, they eventually negotiated relatively light terms of surrender with their imperial 
                                                             
40 For the use of similar symbols in the modern world see Cook (2006), 637-665; Holmes (2003), 360-393, and 
for their cross-cultural applicability in antiquity, see above, n.28. 
41 Thuc. 4.97.2, with additional discussion in Bederman (2001), 154-155, 174, 177; Lanni (2008), 469-489; Low 
(2007), 77-128; Mitchell (1997), 41, 44; Phillipson (1911), 28, 30, 32, 43, 58; Sheets (1994), 54-56, 62; cf. 
Herman (1990), 84; Koh (1997), p.2604.  
42 Aristot. Pol. 1.1255a; Xen. Cyrop. 3.3.45, 4.2.26, 7.5.73, Hell. 7.4.26. Once a surrender had been accepted, 
however, mistreatment was generally considered transgressive (see, for instance, Diod. Sic. 13.23.1-5, 30.18.2; 
Eur. Heraclid. 879-82, 928-74; Hdt. 1.165.1-67.4; On. 25.4-5; Plut. Per. 23.1-2; Thuc. 3.58.3; Xen. Hell. 2.1.32; 
cf. Thuc. 3.32.1-2). Nevertheless, even in such circumstances, the victor could still determine the fate of the 
vanquished. Consider esp. the killing of captives after the naval engagement at Leukimme in 435 BC (Thuc. 
1.30.1-2), the fates of the Plataeans in 427 BC (Thuc. 2.71.1-78.4, 3.20.1-24.3, 52.1-68.5) and the Melians in 
416 BC (Thuc. 5.116.3-4), as well as the apparent execution of those Athenians captured after Aegospotami, 
405 BC (Xen. Hell. 2.1.31-2; cf. Plut. Lys. 9-11.6, 13.1, Paus. 9.32.9), all of which explain the desirability of 
terms (see esp. Thuc. 7.81.1-82.3). For further discussion, see Dayton (2003), 52-79; Ducrey (1986), 253-278; 
Karavites (1982), esp. 13-32; Kelly (2014), 147-167; Krentz (2002), 30-34; Lanni (2008), esp. 477-482; Naiden 
(2006), 171-218; Parker (1983), 146, 181-186; Philipson (1911), esp. 257-259; Sheets (1994), esp. 57-58; van 
Wees (2011), 69-110. 





 Similarly, when Samos revolted in 440 BC, the Samians withstood siege for eight 
months before they also surrendered successfully on relatively light terms.
45
 Nearly ten years 
later, Potidaea endured a similar fate: the Potidaeans revolted in 432 BC, but after they had 
been reduced to eating each other, they offered to surrender to the Athenians 430 BC, and 
since they were also suffering, particularly from exposure, plague, and the endless 
haemorrhaging of blood and treasure, they were glad to accept.
46
 Finally, at the end of the 
Peloponnesian War, Athens was besieged by land and sea, and after the Athenians began to 
starve, despite all the brutalities they had perpetrated during the long war, they too 
successfully negotiated terms of surrender.
47
 Surrenders were also possible during operations 
against forts and other fortified positions. Of course, given the nature of operations against 
fixed positions, the garrisons defending such places were often massacred,
48
  but on some 
occasions, such as during the storming of the forts on Plemmyrium during the Sicilian 
campaign, prisoners were taken.
49
  
 Successful surrenders are also relatively common in the second category, namely 
naval operations.
50
 Thucydides considered a sea battle that was not followed by pursuit or the 
capture of prisoners to be anomalous, and it is easy to see why.
51
 After Phormio’s famous 
victory off Patras in 429 BC, the Athenians captured twelve Peloponnesian ships along with 
                                                             
44 Thuc. 1.100.2-101.3. 
45 Thuc. 1.115.2-117.1, also Aristoph. Wasps. 283; Diod Sic. 12.27-8; Plut. Per. 24.1-28.3.  
46 Thuc. 2.70.1-4. For the siege itself, see 1.57.1-67.1, 2.58.1-3, 3.17.2-3. 
47 Xen. Hell. 2.2.10-23. 
48See, for instance, Notium, 428/7 BC (Thuc. 3.34.1-4); Torone, 424/3 BC (Thuc. 4.110.1-116.3); Labdalum, 
414 BC (Thuc. 7.3.4-5).   
49 For examples, see Megara, 424 BC (Thuc. 4.69.1-4); Torone, 422 BC (Thuc. 5.3.1-2); Plemmyrium, 413 BC 
(Thuc. 7.22.1-24.3); Polichnē, 411 BC (Thuc. 8.23.6); Methymna, 406 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.6.12-15); Cromnus, 
365 BC (Xen. Hell. 7.4.20-5, 27).  
50 See, for instance, Hdt. 6.93.1, 8.4.1-21.2; Thuc. 1.55.1, 2.83.1-84.5, 4.37.1-38.5, Xen. Hell. 1.5.11-14, 6.15-
38, although massacres are common too, for which see Hdt. 8.75.1-97.2; Thuc. 2.86.1-92.7, 7.52.1-54.4, 8.95.1-
7, with Hanson (2005), 235-269; van Wees (2011), 69-110. Quite why some crews are taken prisoner and others 
are killed remains opaque: the mood of the victors, the demeanour and status of the defeated, the nature and 
course of the conflict, and the prevailing logistic situation all no doubt play a part, but sadly, the sources are 
largely silent about such factors. 
51 Thuc. 7.34.6. 
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most of their crews.
52
 In 409 BC, an Athenian squadron at Methymna intercepted twenty-five 
Syracusan ships and captured four of them along with their crews.
53
 In 407 BC, the Athenians 
were defeated by Lysander’s fleet at Notium and lost fifteen ships, and whilst most of the 
crews escaped, others were captured.
54
 The Peloponnesian War, of course, produced other 
similar incidents, as did the triangular conflicts of the fourth century.
55
 For instance, in 377 
BC, in a minor action off Pagasae, the Spartans engaged a two Theban triremes and captured 
both along with their crews.
56
 Finally, in 373 BC, on Corcyra, Iphicrates’ superbly drilled 




How then, do these incidents compare with those in the third category, namely 
operations on land? Sadly, most of the evidence is presented without supporting narrative,
58
 
but where sufficient detail is provided, it is clear that successful surrenders in all three 
categories share a common denominator, namely, when Greeks allow an enemy to surrender, 
they do so only when they exercise control of the tactical situation, and as a result, are able to 
accept a surrender without endangering themselves. This is obvious in siege warfare, where 
the victor surrounds and controls the physical location, and thus the people therein,
59
 and 
similarly, in naval warfare, since a crew is easily contained and dominated whilst aboard ship 
and helpless when ashore, since they typically lack the weapons required for close combat.
60
 
This common denominator, however, is less obvious in those surrenders on land already 
                                                             
52 Thuc. 2.83.1-84.5. 
53 Xen. Hell. 1.2.11-14. 
54 Xen. Hell. 1.5.11-14. 
55 Consider, for example, the captures at Andros, in 406 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.5.18-19), and in the same year, 
Mytilene (Xen. Hell. 6.15-38). 
56 Xen. Hell. 5.4.56-7. 
57 Xen. Hell. 6.2.32-36. 
58 See Section 2 above.  
59 For this principle in medieval warfare, see Gillingham (2012), 55-72. 
60 See, for example, Cyzicus, 410 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.1.11-18); cf. Xen. Hell. 1.2.1, which describes how ships’ 
crews must be armed before they can be expected to fight as light infantry.  
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discussed, but where there is sufficient narrative to sustain analysis, its presence is still 
detectable.   
 Consider, for instance, the Theban surrender at Thermopylae in 480 BC.
61
 Whilst not 
strictly an example of Greek battlefield practice, the incident remains instructive, especially 
because the Greeks considered both sides bound by the same principles.
62
 Of course, the 
initial killing of the surrendering Thebans may still reflect different cultural expectations,
63
 
but it seems more likely that this was the product of the tactically confused and emotionally 
charged circumstances in which the surrender took place: the Persians were still facing 
organised resistance from the Spartans, and they may have been reluctant to spare their 
enemy after suffering so many casualties assaulting the pass.
64
 What is clear, however, is that 
the Persians exercised tactical control over the battlefield: once they had infiltrated forces to 




 The same is true of the Theban surrender at Plataea in 431 BC. Leaving aside isolated 
stragglers, the main concentration of Thebans was safely contained within a large building. 
The victors, then, exercised tactical control over the situation and as such, they were able to 
accept the surrender of the Thebans without exposing themselves to further risk.
66
 Similarly, 
when the Spartans surrendered on Sphacteria in 425 BC, they did so on an island effectively 
isolated by Athenian naval dominance and, in addition, they had been corralled onto a small 
part of that island and were on the verge of total defeat and massacre. These circumstances 
granted the Athenians such complete tactical control that they were able to delay their final 
                                                             
61 Hdt. 7.233.1-2. 
62 For collected evidence, see esp. Hunt (2010), 72-107; Low (2007), 77-128. 
63 Consider, for instance, the fate of the surrendering Macedonians at Cynoscephalae (197 BC), whose 
symbolism, according to Polybius, was initially lost on the victorious Romans (Polyb. 18.24-27). 
64 Hdt. 7.202.1-238.2, with additional evidence in ns.124-5 below. 
65 Hdt. 7.213.1-223.4. 
66 Thuc. 2.4.5-8. 
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assault in order to initiate the parley that eventually led to the Spartan surrender.
67
 
Comparable conditions prevailed on Sicily in 413 BC. Demosthenes’ men were fixed in 
position and trapped within a walled enclosure surrounded by enemy forces. This, again, 
granted the Syracusans such complete tactical control that they too were able pause their 
operations and initiate the parley that led to Demosthenes’ surrender.
68
  
The situation, however, that led to the eventual capture of Nicias and his men was 
more fluid. They were trapped at the crossing of the Assinarus and were in the process of 
being massacred when Nicias initiated a parley with his counterpart, Gylippus, who was able 
to stop the killing and get the men under his command to take prisoners. Again, the incident 
is instructive. The Athenians and their allies had lost their capacity for resistance and were 
trapped in a location controlled by the victors. This probably accounts for their ability to 
eventually surrender, yet, it is clear nevertheless, that for many Syracusans, faced by chaos 
and confusion, their first instinct was not to capture, but to kill.
69
 
Finally, similar circumstances pertain to both cavalry captures described by 
Xenophon. The first, recounted by Xenophon in his Anabasis, occurred at the start of the long 
march when the Greeks ambushed harassing light infantry and cavalry. As Xenophon relates, 
some of these troops fled into a wadi, and while the infantry were killed during the pursuit, 
no less than eighteen cavalrymen were captured.
70
 Again, although it is clear that the Greeks 
did not control the entire battlefield, they did control the situation in the wadi, and as such, 
they could take prisoners.
71
 The second took place during the run up to the battle of Coronea 
in 394 BC, when Agesilaos had his horsemen counter-attacked harassing enemy cavalry. 
Some of these men, according to Xenophon, were caught with their horses half-turned, and 
                                                             
67 Thuc. 4.37.1-38.5. 
68 Thuc. 7.81.1-82.3. 
69 Thuc. 7.84.1-87.6. 
70 Xen. Anab. 3.4.4-5; cf. 1.6.2, which details deliberation on the subject of prisoner taking. 
71 Tellingly, none of the infantry survived the encounter, perhaps because they were worth less to the Greeks 
than the cavalrymen (consider esp. Xen. Cyrop. 4.1.11, and for discussion of ransom, see below, n.119). This, 
certainly, was the case in the medieval period, for which see Gillingham (2012), 55-72. 
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they were captured rather than killed.
72
 Once more, while the victors did not control the entire 
battlefield, tellingly, the capture occurred very near to Agesilaos’ army, so prisoners could be 
taken in relative safety and thereafter easily secured.
73
 
These episodes suggest, therefore, that the Greeks were sometimes willing to accept a 
surrender and take prisoners, but only when they are able to do so without unduly risking 
themselves in the process.
74
 The incidents discussed above, however, are in many respects 
idiosyncratic, most pertinently because they do not feature the most dangerous phase of 
battle, namely the point at which organised combat gives way to the pursuit and slaughter of 




4. The Purpose of Pursuit 
 
This phase of battle was not only the most dangerous phase for defeated troops, it was 
also the most obvious situation in which they might attempt to surrender.
76
 This, of course, 
was impossible during close quarters battle between opposing phalanxes, and unsurprisingly, 
there is no evidence of capitulation in combat.
77
 When, however, one phalanx broke another, 
and the defeated side turned to flee, then, according to Plato at least, all a man had to was 
throw down his arms and supplicate his pursuers.
78
 The pursuit phase of battle, however, is a 
distinct tactical context, and this raises an obvious question: is capitulation in such 
circumstances likely or even possible? 
                                                             
72 Xen. Ages. 2.2-5; cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.4.21. 
73 It is interesting that Agesilaos (Xen. Ages. 2.3) explicitly ordered his troops to pursue determinedly and not to 
let the enemy rally, but, in these circumstances at least, such instructions did not preclude the taking of 
prisoners.  
74 Sometimes, however, they were not so inclined, as the Spartan massacre described in Xen. Hell. 4.4.11-12 
reveals. See also Section 5 below.  
75 For the dispersal of defeated combatants during pursuit, see Plut. Pel. 32.7; Xen. Hell. 5.3.3-7, with Vaughn 
(1991), 8-62, also Hanson (2000), 171-184, 197-209. 
76 See Section 1 above. 
77 Hoplite combat, of course, is subject to competing interpretations, but close-quarters battle is common to all. 
For a summary of the debate, see Crowley (2012), esp. 54. 
78 Plat. Apol. 39a; cf. Xen. Cyrop. 4.2.21. 
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The first step in answering this question is to consider why, and indeed, to what extent 
the Greeks pursued their defeated enemies. Hanson, for instance, believes that the Greeks 
found the slaughter of defeated men unpalatable, and Ober, albeit for less moralistic reasons, 
argues that their pursuits were generally limited.
79
 Support for this view is provided by 
Thucydides’ account of 1
st
 Mantineia, 418 BC: in a rare authorial interjection, he observes 
that while the Spartans fight long and hard, once the enemy break, their pursuits are limited in 
both time and distance (βραχείας καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ τὰς διώξεις).
80
 Other evidence bolsters 
Ober’s opinion,
81
 but as Krentz observes, this also relates to the Spartans, and as he 
concludes, their concerns are not moral but tactical, that is to say, they preferred to maintain 
concentration of force and the mutual protection afforded by formation rather than risk their 
troops in a dispersed and scattered pursuit of beaten enemies.
82
 
Avoiding this risk, of course, is not the only advantage of such a policy. For hoplites, 
rout is more dangerous than battle, and so their best hope of salvation was victory. As Krentz 
notes, however, the Spartan policy of limited pursuit modifies this battlefield dynamic, 
allowing them to face opponents who fight in the knowledge that flight is safer than 
combat.
83
 The temptation to run would also be augmented by another deliberate Spartan 
practice, namely their slow and orderly advance, and it is unsurprising to see, when facing 
Spartans, that many opponents fled at or even before first contact.
84
 The limited pursuit, then, 
was a tactically determined Spartan idiosyncrasy, and Krentz is correct to conclude that 
Thucydides’ observation implies that, for the rest of the Greeks, an unlimited pursuit was 
                                                             
79 Hanson, (1995), 219-286; Ober (1996), 53-71, with similar views in Hammond (1978), 136-140. 
80 Thuc. 5.73.4; cf. Hdt. 9.77.1-2. 
81 See, for example, Hdt. 9.77.1-2; Paus. 4.8.11; Thuc. 5.41.2. 
82 Paus. 4.8.11, with Krentz (2002), 30-31. See also Dayton (2003), 52-79. For dispersal during pursuit, see n.75 
above. 
83 Krentz (2002), 30. See also Plut. Lyc. 22.5. 
84 See, for instance, Plut. Ages. 33.3-8; Thuc. 5.10.1-9, 5.72.1-4; Xen. Hell. 3.2.17, 4.3.17, 7.1.28-31. For more 
extended discussion of Sparta’s use of military psychology, see Millender (2016), 162-194, also Konijnendijk 





 Part of the explanation for this is what van Wees describes as the ethic of 
‘conspicuous destruction’. As he argues, instead of exercising restraint, the Greeks often 
slaughtered their enemies not just because they derived personal and collective kleos from 
such killing, but also because a high body count deterred future aggression and reduced a 
rival state’s capacity for combat.
86
  
Such motives, no doubt, encouraged the Greeks to pursue their enemies, but they also 
pursued for more immediate reasons. Casualties were relatively light during the combat phase 
of battle, and that meant that the core strength of a hostile army remained relatively 
undiminished as it quit the field.
87
 What that army lost, however, was its will to fight and its 
tactical order (εὐταξία).
88
 This deficit, of course, was a mere function of time and morale, that 
is to say, if a beaten enemy army was allowed sufficient time, it might regain its will to fight, 
reform its ranks and re-engage its ostensibly victorious opponent.  
Greek troops, admittedly, were generally untrained amateurs, but many had years of 
practical experience, and their ability to reform and re-engage was far more than a theoretical 
possibility.
89
 For instance, at Solygeia in 425 BC, the Corinthian left wing was initially 
defeated by the Athenian right, but it was allowed to retire upon high ground, whereupon it 
reformed, re-engaged, routed and then pursued its initially victorious opponents all the way to 
                                                             
85 See esp. Xen. Anab. 3.4.4, Cav. 3.11; Thuc. 5.41.2, 6.70.3, with Krentz (1985), 13-20, (2002), 30, also Dayton 
(2003), 52-79; Rawlings (2007), 81-103; cf. Philipson (1911), 234-268. For examples of merciless pursuits, see 
Marathon, 490 BC (Hdt. 6.109.1-115.1), Plataea, 479 BC (Hdt. 9.68.1-70.5), Delphi, 480 BC (Hdt. 8.35.1-39.2), 
Aetolia, 427/6 BC (Thuc. 3.94.1-98.5), Ambracia, 426 BC (Thuc. 3.110-113.6), Delion, 424 BC (Thuc. 4.89.1-
101.2; cf. Plat. Symp. 221a-c), Abydus, 409 BC (Xen. Hell. 1.2.15-17), Haliartus, 395 BC (Xen. Hell. 3.5.19-
20), Cremaste, 389 BC (Xen. Hell. 4.8.35-39), Olynthus, 381 BC (Xen. Hell. 5.3.3-7); Cynoscephalae, 364 BC 
(Plut. Pel. 32.7). Consider also Xen. Cyrop. 1.4.23, 3.3.65-66, 5.4.1-9. 
86 Hdt. 6.75.1-84.3, 7.148.1-4; Paus. 2.20.8-10; van Wees (2004), 118-38, (2011), 69-110. Interestingly, van 
Wees does not feel this imperative precludes capture ((2004), 135, with some support in n.73 above). See also 
Lanni (2008), 480; Kelly (2014), 157; Naiden (2006), 136; Worley (1994), esp. 83-122. For this principle in 
modern warfare, see Wallace (2012), 955-981. 
87 Krentz (1985), 13-20. 
88 As is the case in the modern world: as both Wesbrook and Cook observe, battles are primary won by breaking 
the enemy’s will to fight rather than by annihilation. See Cook (2006), 637-665; Wesbrook (1980), 244-78, also 
Ferguson (2004), 148-192. For the importance of εὐταξία, see Crowley (2012), 49-68. 
89 See esp. Xen. Hunt. 12.5-6, also Anab. 6.5.28. For Greek military training, or the lack thereof, see Crowley 





 Similarly, during the Sicilian Campaign, as the Athenians were assaulting the 
Syracusan counter-wall, they engaged and defeated a Syracusan force but effective pursuit 
was prevented by proximity of Syracuse and the bold action of the Syracusan cavalry. The 
defeated Syracusans then reformed opposite the ostensibly victorious Athenians 
(ἀντετάξαντο πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ σφᾶς Ἀθηναίους) and despatched an assault force against 
Athenian fortifications on Epipolae, which Nicias held only after he employed the desperate 
expedient of setting fire to his own timber supplies and siege engines (τὰς μηχανὰς).
91
 Even 
more famously, at Coroneia in 394 BC, the Spartans allowed the defeated Thebans the 
opportunity to re-dress their ranks and re-engage. Worse still, since they had put themselves 
between their enemies and safety, they suffered the humiliation of having their apparently 




Such incidents were unusual, but they unequivocally demonstrate that a beaten army 
remains a threat even after it quits the field.
93
 Consequently, since no victorious army wishes 
to re-fight a battle it has just won, the safest and most sensible thing to do when an enemy 
force breaks is to ensure it is never given the opportunity to reform.
94
 Of course, keeping a 
beaten enemy under pressure, as the concerns of the Spartans demonstrate, was not primarily 
a job for hoplites.
95
 Certainly, hoplites could be and were used in pursuit,
96
 but this task was 
more suited to cavalry and light infantry whose tactical mobility left them less reliant on 
                                                             
90 Thuc. 4.42.1-44.6. It seems that the Athenian right may also have reformed after its rout and continued to play 
a part in this confused engagement but, unfortunately, this is not entirely clear from Thucydides’ condensed 
narrative. 
91 Thuc. 6.101.1-102.4. For a similar incident during the battle of Syracuse, 415 BC, see 6.67.1-70.4. 
92 Xen. Hell. 4.3.13-21. 
93 Consider also Thuc. 6.101.1-6; Xen. Anab. 6.5.28, 7.3.47, Hell. 3.5.19-20, 6.4.8-15, Hunt. 12.5-6, with further 
discussion in Dayton (2003), 52-79.  
94 As Hammond (1978), 140, observes, successful pursuits rely on the speed of the pursuers. 
95 See above, n.82, with  Xen. Cyrop. 4.3.5-23; Anderson (1970), 141-164; Bugh (1988), 65-66, pp.79-107; 
Spence (1993), 157-163. 





 Such troops, when deployed, generally played a subordinate role in combat, 
guarding the flanks and rear of friendly forces or attacking those of the enemy.
98
 These tasks, 
admittedly, were important, but mobile forces, particularly cavalry, contributed most at the 
conclusion of combat, when the enemy turned to flee.
99
    
   Xenophon, himself a cavalryman, is particularly instructive on the role of the 
cavalry during pursuit. In his Anabasis, he emphasises how worried the Greeks were by their 
initial lack of cavalry, since, without horsemen, they would not be able to survive defeat 
(ἡττηθέντων δὲ αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς ἂν λειφθείη), and if they won, they would not be able to kill 
any of the enemy (νικῶντες μὲν οὐδένα ἂν κατακάνοιεν).
100
 What he means by this, if there 
can be any doubt, is confirmed elsewhere, particularly in his Memorabilia and, of course, his 
Cavalry Commander: during pursuit, the role of cavalry is to ride down and kill as many men 
as possible (τοῦ βάλλειν ὡς πλείστους ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων ἐπιμέλειάν τινα ποιήσει),
101
 and by 
doing so, to exploit a victory to the fullest extent by inflicting maximum losses on the enemy 
(βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους μάλιστα δύναιντ᾽ ἄν).
102
 To be able to do this, Xenophon 
stresses that cavalrymen should know their horses,
103
 how long it takes to ride down a 
running man,
104
 and since men flee into broken ground,
105
 how to traverse any kind of 
terrain.
106
   
The pursuit, therefore, was a tactical environment determined by the victor’s need to 
keep the defeated enemy running, and this objective was primarily achieved by the enemy’s 
                                                             
97 See above, n.88. 
98 See, for instance, Thuc. 4.89.1-101.1 (Delium, 424 BC) and 5.66.1–74.3 (1st Mantineia, 418 BC). 
99 Spence (1993), esp. 151-163; Worley (1994), esp. 83-122. 
100 Xen. Anab. 3.1.2. 
101 Xen. Mem. 3.3.7. 
102 Xen. Cav. 1.6, also Mem. 3.3.7, with additional discussion in Spence (1993), esp. 157-163; Worley (1994), 
esp. 83-122. 
103 Xen. Cav. 5.4. 
104 Xen. Cav. 5.1. 
105 Xen. Anab. 3.4.24, also Thuc. 7.5-6.  
106 Xen. Cav. 1.18-20, 2.1, 2.9, 4.4, 6.5, 8.3, with Spence (1993), esp. pp.48-49. 
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fear of pursuing light infantry and cavalry.
107
 In such circumstances, then, would a pursuer be 
willing to pause long enough to take prisoners? Certainly, prisoner taking during the pursuit 
was not impossible, but prisoners were a significant drain on the resources of a victorious 
army: they had to be placed in a secure area, fed, watered, and guarded.
108
 Worse still, they 
were an ongoing security threat to their captors, and as such, they constituted an impediment 
to further combat operations.
109
 Xenophon describes how, in 410 BC, the Athenians captured 
four Syracusan ships with their crews off the coast of Methymna on Lesbos. They then had to 
transfer their these prisoners all the way back to Athens and where they were subsequently 
imprisoned in quarries in the Piraeus, but, embarrassingly, after all this effort, the captured 
Syracusans tunnelled their way out and escaped.
110
 He also relates how, in 377 BC, the 
Spartans at Oreus captured around three hundred Theban sailors in a minor naval 
engagement. These men were imprisoned on the acropolis, but they were improperly 
guarded, and they not only escaped, they seized the acropolis, after which, to add insult to 
injury, the whole city then revolted.
111
  
Prisoners, then, are an annoyance, and during operations on land, transferring them 
from the place they were captured back to the location of friendly forces presented their 
                                                             
107 Xen. Cyrop. 2.1.9, Ages. 2.2-5. 
108 Arrington (2015), 103, 107 argues that the  relief crowning the Athenian casualty list commemorating the 
dead of the Corinthian War (currently in the National Archaeological Museum, Athens, accession no. 2744) 
depicts prisoner taking. Certainly, his interpretation may be correct, but the defeated hoplite’s retention of his 
shield argues against this, as does the tendency to show cavalry killing hoplites (for which see Arrington (2010); 
Low (2002), 102-22). Other evidence is just as ambiguous. for instance, the scene which appears on a red-figure 
calyx-krater by the Painter of the Berlin Dancing Girl (Davis Museum at Wellesley College, accession no. 
1976.42), which shows a Spartan hoplite confronting a charging cavalryman, may depict the moment before he 
is taken prisoner or a fight to the death which, at the moment of depiction, remains undecided.  
109 Xen. Anab. 4.1.12-14, Cyrop. 4.4.1, 6-13, Hell. 1.6.15-38, 3.2.3-4, 4.5.6; Thuc. 1.29.1-30.1, 1.45.1-55.2; cf. 
Ps. Xen. Const. Ath. 3.4-5, with Tritle (2013), 279-293; van Wees (2011), 69-110. For similar concerns in the 
more modern world, see Best (1980), esp. 125-126; Bourke (1999), 171-214; Cook (2006), 637-665; Ferguson 
(1998), 367-394, (2004), 148-192; Grauer (2014), 622-655; Grossman (1996), 203-213; Holmes (2003), 360-
393. This fact also explains the killing of French prisoners at Agincourt, for which see Keegan (1976), 85-86, 
107-112. 
110 Xen. Hell. 1.2.112-14. 
111 Xen. Hell. 5.4.56-57. 
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captors with obvious problems.
112
 Unfortunately, however, how this potentially dangerous 
procedure was achieved in antiquity remains opaque. Diodorus imagines Gelon’s 
cavalrymen, in 480 BC, capturing over ten thousand Carthaginians, with each trooper taking 
as many of the enemy as he could drive before him (τοσούτους ἀνῆγον αἰχμαλώτους ὅσους 
ἕκαστος ἄγειν ἠδύνατο).
113
 Prisoners, however, are rarely as docile as those imagined by 
Diodorus,
114
 and leaving aside the historicity of this incident, it is clear that prisoner handling 
was a potentially dangerous activity, and as such, it was one that required the participation of 
significant numbers of pursuers if it was to be conducted in relative safety.
115
 If then, men 
stopped to take and escort prisoners to the rear, they not only put themselves at unnecessary 
risk, they also reduced the force and momentum of the pursuit. Furthermore, since both of 
these variables are inversely linked, any increase in prisoner taking progressively weakened 
the pursuit and increased the risk of counter-attack.
116
 Thus, whilst pursuit and slaughter were 
mutually reinforcing activities, pursuit and prisoner taking were functionally incompatible.  
 
5. Kill or Capture 
 
 There were, nevertheless, some incentives to take prisoners, the most obvious of 
which was the prospect of financial reward.
117
 This, however, was not quite as tempting as it 
might seem. As Rosivach argues, the fact that Greek men made problematic slaves depressed 
their market value,
118
 and while ransom was potentially profitable, it was more a medium to 
                                                             
112 The Spartans captured on Sphacteria, for instance, had to be split up into batches and distributed among 
various Athenian ships, for which see Thuc. 4.37.1-38.5; cf. Xen. Hell. 7.4.20-5, 27.   
113 Diod. Sic. 11.21.1-3, 25.1-5; cf. Xen. Cyrop. 5.3.1. 
114 For an obvious exception, consider the surrender of Iraqi soldiers to coalition forces in 1991.  
115 Wylie (1986), 125-41, suggests a hoplite could escort one prisoner, and a cavalryman three, and these low 
ratios accord well with the escort of Greek art’s most popular prisoner, Silenus (for which see, for instance, 
Beazley 6908; 9990; 202854; 303453). Modern firearms, of course, increase efficiency: as Ferguson (2004), 
148-192 notes, in modern warfare one or two soldiers would be expected to escort as many as ten prisoners.  
116 For this principle in modern warfare, see Cook (2006), 637-665; Ferguson (2004), 148-192. 
117 For the operation of incentives in modern warfare, see Ferguson (2004), 148-192. 
118 Rosivach (1999), 129-157. In some circumstances, however, the sale of prisoners could provide a welcome 
bonus for the victors, see, for instance, Xen. Anab. 5.3.4, also 4.1.12. 
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long term investment rather than one which offered immediate gain.
119
 Prisoners were also a 
potential source of intelligence, although the value of their knowledge peaked prior to battle 
and declined sharply after the conclusion of combat.
120
 More enduring, however, was the 
strategic value of prisoners: after the battle of Sybota, 433 BC, the Corinthians cultivated two 
hundred and fifty captured Corcyraeans for later use as a fifth column,
121
 and after 
Sphacteria, 425 BC, the Athenians threatened to kill their Spartan prisoners if Attica were 




 Such strategic concerns, however, were remote from the immediate issues facing 
pursuers.
123
 They, of course, were cutting down men who had, prior thereto, been killing their 
comrades and attempting to kill them, and even if they were willing and able to stop killing 
under such circumstances,
124
 they were often disinclined to do so because of their desire for 
revenge and hatred of their enemy.
125
 Even more pressing were concerns about their own 
safety, which, as they knew, was best preserved by maintaining the pace of the pursuit.
126
 
This, as discussed, was directly threatened by prisoner taking, and if, therefore, pursuers were 
faced with the choice of compromising their safety in order to capture enemy combatants, or 
                                                             
119 See, for example, Aeschin. 2.100; Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1134b21-2; Dem. 18.268, 19.166-71, 20.42, 53.6-11, 
57.18-19; Hdt. 5.77.1-4, 6.79.1; Is. 5.43; Justin 9.4.1-10; Lys. 12.20, 19.59, 20.24-5; Paus. 9.15.4; Thuc. 3.70.1, 
4.69.3, 6.5.3; Xen. Hell. 6.2.35-6, with additional evidence and discussion in Ducrey (1986), 233-251; Kelly 
(1970), 127-131; Rosivach (1999), 129-157; Sternberg (2006), 42-75; van Wees (2004), 145-150. 
120 See above, n.25. 
121 Thuc. 1.55.1. 
122 For the strategic use of prisoners (incl. those captured on Sphacteria) as hostages or in prisoner exchanges, 
see Thuc. 2.103.1, 4.117.1-119.3, 5.3.4, 18.7, 21.1, 35.5, 77.1; Xen. Cyrop. 3.2.10-13, 4.4.1, 6-13; Kelly (1970), 
127-131; Panagopoulos (1978), passim; Pritchett (1991), 297-299; Rosivach (1999), 129-157.  
123 For this situation in modern warfare, see Ferguson (2004), 148-192. 
124 Tyrt. fr. 11.17-18; Xen. Hiero 2.15-16; cf. Thuc. 4.130.6, also Cook (2006), 637-665; Ferguson (1998), 367-
394, (2004), 148-192; Grauer (2014), 622-655; Halsall (2003), 211; Holmes (2003), 360-393; Keegan (1976), 
46-54; Konstan (2001), 75-104; Parker (1983), 184; Tritle (2013), 279-293. According to Holmes (2003), 360-
393, in modern close combat, only half of those who try to surrender will survive. 
125 Consider, for example, the killings that took place after the battle of Sybota, 433 BC (Thuc. 1.45.1-55.2) and 
the night assault on Epipolae, 413 BC (Thuc. 7.43.2-45.2), as well as the desire of the Syracusans not to let the 
Athenian expeditionary force escape. For further discussion, see Ducrey (1986), 233-251. 
126 For the entirely reasonable fear of dying in the moment of victory, see Thuc. 7.81.5. Hence, as Cook (2006), 
637-665, observes, modern soldiers generally refuse to take prisoners until victory is certain, something also 
reflected in Xen. Cyrop. 4.2.24-28. 
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safeguarding their safety by slaughtering them without mercy, it seems reasonable to 
conclude they would choose to kill rather than capture.
127
  
 Certainly, the evidence suggests that once the pursuit was underway, both sides 
operated on the assumption that surrender was no longer a realistic option. When ranks broke, 
and men turned to flee, they often entered a state of blind panic. Thucydides describes men 
trampling each other in their haste to escape the victorious Spartans at 1
st
 Mantineia in 418 
BC.
128
 He describes men leaping from cliffs to escape the rampaging Syracusans after the 
failed night assault on Epipolae in 413 BC, and with good reason, since every straggler 
caught when the sun came up was ridden down by cavalry and killed.
129
 Similarly, 
Xenophon, in his account of the Corinthian War, describes a stampede so severe that men not 
only climbed fortifications and leapt to their deaths, others were trampled and died by 
suffocation.
130
 Other authors describe defeated men running in headlong panic, and a wide 
convergence of evidence confirms that, as the desire to escape overrode all else, men 
abandoned their shields in order to facilitate their uncontrolled flight.
131
 
The reason for such panic, of course, is simple: fleeing men expected to be killed if 
they were caught.
132
 According to Xenophon, chasing and killing the enemy, was, for the 
pursuers, a source of almost indescribable pleasure (οὐ ῥᾴδιον εἰπεῖν ὅσην… ἡδονὴν), a task 
they could take pride in (ὡς δὲ γαυροῦνται ἐπὶ τῷ ἔργῳ), and one that bestowed a shining 
reputation (δόξαν λαμπρὰν) on participants. Revealingly, Xenophon, imagines men deriving 
so much social capital from killing their enemies that they would exaggerate their personal 
                                                             
127 Xen. Cyrop. 4.2.24-28, Hunt. 12.5-6. For the operation of this principle in modern warfare, see Section 1 
generally, also n.126 above. 
128 Thuc. 5.72.1-4. 
129 Thuc. 7.43.2-45.2. See also, 2.4.4, which describes fleeing Thebans leaping to their deaths at Plataea in 431 
BC. 
130 Xen. Hell. 4.4.11-12. 
131 Xen. Hell. 1.2.3, also Alc. fr. 428a; Archil. fr. 5; Aristoph. Birds 1470-80, Thes. 825; Hdt. 5.95.1; Lys. 9.1, 8-
9, 12, 21-5, 30; Plat. Symp. 221b; Plut. Nic. 21.9; Thuc. 7.45.2. 
132 Archil. fr. 59, 101; Hdt. 4.136.1; IG II2 6217; Plat. Lach. 182a-b, Laws 4.706c-707a, Symp. 221b; Tyrt. 
10.21-7, 11.17-20; Xen. Ages. 1.32, Anab. 6.5.23, Cyrop. 3.3.45, 4.2.39, Hell. 5.3.2; cf. Plat. Prot. 326b-c, Rep. 
5.468a-b. It is revealing that after Coronea in 394 BC, enemy survivors sought refuge as suppliants in a nearby 
temple rather than surrender to the victorious Spartans (see Xen. Hell. 4.3.20; Ages. 11.1). 
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In such circumstances, men ran to survive, and since the primary point of pursuit was 
to deny them pause, they were often pursued for as long and as far as possible, sometimes all 
the way to friendly territory or until night covered their escape. Those who were cut off or 
trapped by terrain were, as van Wees observes, often annihilated.
134
 For example, after their 
defeat in the Battle of the Oldest and Youngest in 458 BC, the Corinthians, mocked by their 
fellow citizens, re-engaged the Athenians and were defeated for a second time. Worse still, 
during the subsequent pursuit, a sizeable contingent blundered into a field surrounded by a 
large ditch, at which point the Athenians blocked their escape, surrounded their position with 
light infantry and stoned all the trapped Corinthians to death.
135
   
 Even more disturbingly, the Greeks had ugly penchant for killing trapped enemies 
with fire. For instance, in 431 BC, when many of the Theban infiltrators had fled into a large 
building, the first thought of their Plataean pursuers was to burn the place down with their 
enemies inside.
136
 Mercifully, they did not, but in c.494 BC, those Argives who had been 
defeated by the Spartans at Sepeia and who had subsequently sought safety in sacred 
space,
137
 namely a grove dedicated to Argos, were not so lucky. According to Herodotus, the 
Spartans, who had surrounded the Argive position, at first killed those they tempted out by 
falsely declaring their ransom had been paid, but then, after this disgraceful ruse had been 
uncovered, they compounded their transgressions by burning the grove down around the 
                                                             
133 Xen. Hiero 2.15-16. See also IG I³ 1353/ML 51/Fornara 101/Tod 41, with additional discussion in Crowley 
(2014), 105-130. For such imperatives in the modern world, see Bourke (1999), 13-43. 
134 van Wees (2011), 69-110. For attempts to cut off an enemy’s retreat, see Marathon, 490 BC (6.109.1-115.1), 
Syracuse, 414 BC (Thuc. 6.101.1-6), Sicily, 413 BC (Thuc. 7.78.1- 87.6).  
135 Thuc. 1.105.3-106.2; cf. Diod. Sic. 11.79; Lys. 2.48-53. 
136 Thuc. 2.4.4-7. 
137 Seeking safety in sacred space was a poor second to that offered by friendly or home territory. It entailed 
being trapped by victorious forces, who could then determine the fate of their defeated adversaries. Of course, 
Agesilaos, after the battle of the Coronea in 394 BC, allowed 80 Theban hoplites who had reached the temple of 
Athena safe conduct (Xen. Hell. 3.4.20, also Ages. 11.1, with n.132 above). Piety, then, offered some protection 
but this was not always the case. For further discussion, see Naiden (2004), 71-91, (2006); Nevin (2017); Parker 
(1983), 146, 181-6, with n.138 below. 
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Argives, killing all those trapped inside.
138
 Similarly, in 427/6 BC, during the denouement of 
Demosthenes’ doomed Aetolian expedition, some of his defeated troops fled into a wood to 
escape pursuing light infantry and died when it too was burned down around them.
139
 Such 
indirect methods, of course, were undeniably cruel, but missiles and fire offer the pursuers 
one signal advantage: they provide a safe means of removing the potential threat presented by 







 Four conclusions, then, follow from the argument offered above. Firstly, the harsh 
imperatives of the battlefield help to explain why, for the Greek historians, there were only 
two categories of people generally left after a battle: the living and the dead,
141
 whose silent 
ranks would include any individual whose offer of surrender was rejected.
142
 They also help 
to explain why it was only the dead who were exchanged after the conclusion of combat.
143
 
Secondly, whilst the Greeks understood the concept of surrender, they considered it a two 
part process: an offer of surrender was made, usually by the defeated, and until that offer was 
accepted, the victor could continue killing without quibble or qualm. Thirdly, despite this, the 
                                                             
138
 Hdt. 6.76.1-82.2. Naturally, given that this story is related by Herodotus in order to explain the madness of 
the Spartan King, Cleomenes, some caution must be exercised. However, the tale is not contradicted by 
Thucydides, whose other examples of similar incidents offer a degree of corroboration. For further discussion, 
see esp. Karavites (1982), 112-113; van Wees (2011), 69-110. 
139 Thuc. 3.94.1-98.5. 
140 The killing of the surviving Spartans at Thermopylae with missiles (Hdt. 7.225.3), often taken as a marker of 
cultural inferiority, accords closely with this imperative. 
141 There are, of course, exceptions (see, for example, Xen. Anab. 7.6.31, Cav. 8.13, Xen. Cyrop. 4.1.19, 5.1.28, 
Mem. 3.12.1-4) but the convention is persuasive enough to be followed by modern historians such as Krentz 
((1985), 13-20), for whom casualties are the dead, and Hanson (2000), whose canonical work makes no mention 
of prisoners or surrender. The wounded are likewise occluded, and it is often thought they would be killed by 
the victors rather than captured. This certainly appears to be expectation on Sicily in 413 BC (Thuc. 7.75.1-7, 
80.1; cf. Isoc. 19.39), but it is not always the case (see, for instance, Hdt. 7.179-82; Thuc. 4.57.3, 7.87.2). For 
further discussion, see Krentz (2007), 180-185; Law (1919), 132-147; Lazenby (1991), 87-109; Sternberg 
(2006), 104-145; Ma (2008), 72-91; Salazar (2013), 294-311; Tritle (2013), 279-293; van Wees (2004), 145-
150. For a similar situation in the medieval period, see Gillingham (2012), 55-72.  
142 Anderson (1969), 263-265, with the methodological implications of their opacity discussed in Grauer (2014), 
622-655, also Cook (2006), 637-665. 
143 Prisoners, of course, lack the religious protection afforded to the dead, and even when they are taken (as in 
Thuc. 4.101.3-4), they are ignored at the point of exchange and their ransom generally seems to have been a 
private affair. See Kelly (1970), 127-131; Pritchett (1991), 245-288, also n.119 above. 
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Greeks we not unduly cruel. When they dominated the battlefield and could, as a result, 
accept a surrender in relative safety, they were often willing to take prisoners.
144
 Fourthly, 
such positive conditions, however, did not prevail in the most dangerous phase of battle, 
namely the pursuit, the primary point of which was to avoid further danger by keeping the 
enemy running. Pausing to take and transfer prisoners, naturally, weakened the pursuit and 
risked the lives of those still pursuing, not to mention those of other friendly forces. 
Consequently, the Greeks killed their enemies without mercy, not out of bloodlust or 
wantonness, but because it was the safest and most sensible thing to do.
145
 This is not to say 
that the surrender envisaged by Plato was an absolute impossibility, but mercy was not 
something a defeated Greek could expect. In short, once combat ended and the pursuit began, 
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